South Sudan: Peace and Security Challenges by Pradhan, Sanjay Kumar

Sanjay Kumar Pradhan*
South Sudan: Peace and Security Challenges
The Extent of Unrest
Since its independence in 2011, the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir
Mayardit (Salva Kiir) has been striving for reconciliation with various ethnic,
tribal, armed groups and communities in the country. As part of his efforts for
the country’s political stability, he has pardoned several leaders who even led
rebellions against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – the
political organisation that brought independence for the country. In the process,
the factional leaders also got incorporated into the Kiir government or his armed
forces. Unfortunately, these rebel leaders brought their own armed forces with
them in the political and military compositions of the country, which in turn,
posed a great challenge to the government in the form of downsizing, reforming
and “right-sizing” the increasingly bloated political and defense sector.1 In 2013,
President Kiir made major changes in his government to downsize and address
governance concerns because of perceived threat to his government and pressure
from international donors to crack down corruption. He replaced two state
governors and dismissed two senior cabinet ministers on corruption charges
and conducted a major cabinet reshuffle, with removal of Vice President Riek
Machar and his entire group of ministers. The President also dismissed the
ruling party secretary-general Pagan Amum, who had been publicly critical of
the dismissals and Rebecca Garang, the widow of the late SPLA (Sudan People’s
Liberation Army) leader, John Garang.2
On the other hand, his notable appointments included Kuol Manyang, the
powerful Dinka governor of the volatile Jonglei state, as defense minister, and
John Kong Nyuon, the previous defense minister, a Nuer and loyal to Kiir, to
the position of Jonglei governorship. Reacting to this radical changes, Riek
Machar and his political allies contend that President Kiir has become
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increasingly dictatorial, using “corruption” allegations to sideline perceived
rivals, and letting “regional and ethnic lobbies” override collective decision
making.3 On the other side, for Kiir and those loyal to him, charges were seen
as politically motivated, and part of a long personal quest for power.
Apart from the immediate cause of conflict between government and other
forces, there were many factors responsible for this negative development in
the country. Firstly, ethnic identities particularly, Dinka and Nuer ethnic
communities have been at loggerheads on the issue of power sharing. Secondly,
during the freedom struggle, the ruling party was the SPLM with its military
wing, the SPLA. But, undisciplined members and officials, within SPLM and
SPLA, demanded a sizeable share in the ministry and government formation.
Thirdly, there are strong circumstantial evidences that the forces of Peter Gadet
and George Athor, the Greater Upper Nile’s insurgencies’ commanders, have
received logistical and material support, including small arms and ammunition,
from Khartoum and other external sources.4 Fourthly, due to mass defections
within the SPLA, the army and army personnel got divided on ethnic lines.
And with the split of party leadership, the split of armed force turned imminent,
and in-fighting in the army gradually spread to civilians on ethnic lines such as
Bor, Bentiu, Malakal, Shilluka, Dinka and Nuer.5 Owing to the ongoing conflict
on ethnic, military and leadership lines, seven out of the 10 states in South
Sudan are affected with civil war and the worst affected territories include
Jonglei6, Unity and Upper Nile.
A Failed State?
South Sudan’s return to war in 2013 has torn the communities apart,
left thousands dead, and turned millions homeless and refugees. As on
September 2014, 1.8 million people were still too scared to return to their homes.
Although humanitarian assistance facilitated to over 3.1 million people in South
Sudan, the international agencies estimate that at least 2.2 million are still facing
either crisis or food insecurity. This situation develops a situation just below
the levels of “famine” or “humanitarian catastrophe”, as referred by international
agencies and analysts. Of the estimated 1.8 million people who have been
displaced, about 1.35 million are within South Sudan and 4,53,600 have fled to
neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya. About
1,00,000 civilians are currently sheltering on UN bases in South Sudan7 and
over 2,00,000 Sudanese refugees are seeking refugees across the border in South
Sudan, who have been trapped between two war zones.8 All these offshoots of
migration have strained the scarce resources of South Sudan, spread of illegal
activities in the country and ethnic antagonism.9
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South Sudan is in social disharmony and violence, characterised with inter
and intra-communal hostility and tribal strife. The uneducated teenage boys
and unemployed youth are fatally susceptible to recruitment by rebel
commanders and opportunistic politicians who use them for their own purpose.
The easy access to weapons and ammunition is responsible for much of the
violence, and the decades-old fighting for access to water and grazing land
between pastoralist communities also fuels the tension. Under these
circumstances the weak state security apparatus finds it extremely difficult to
provide protection to civilians and illicit flow of arms. In addition, the
extrajudicial killings, custodial and targeted deaths in police stations generate
questions over the integrity and neutrality of government machinery for the
restoration and enhancement of peace in the country. All these prove that South
Sudan is in horrific state of affairs and most people are living in constant threat
of violence.10
After almost five years of self-rule, the South Sudanese government is still
failing to meet the basic needs of its people. Despite claims that vast sums have
been spent on investment in infrastructure, there has been very little expenditure
on medical services and education. The country is one of the poorest countries
in Africa with the second-worst literacy rate in the world after Mali’s literacy
rate of 26.2 per cent. South Sudan has a literacy rate of just 27 per cent for the
total population and 16 per cent for the female population.11 Only 10 per cent
of children complete primary schooling and 64 per cent of children reach the
last stage of school education in the country.12
South Sudan is one of the HIV/AIDS affected zones in the world with
adult prevalence rate of 3.1 per cent.13 Besides, dengue fever, meningococcal
meningitis, bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, sleeping sickness, rabies, hepatitis
A and E, typhoid fever, etc., continue to threaten lives in South Sudan today.14
The country has the world’s worst maternal mortality rate, one-fifth of all
children are acutely malnourished,15 about 28 per cent of them under the age of
five in South Sudan are moderately or severely underweight, and the Unity
state has the highest proportion of children suffering malnourishment (46 per
cent) in the country.16 The health problem is aggravated more with water crisis
and drinking water problems. In Sudan, only 69 per cent households have access
to clean water and just two per cent households have water on the premises.17
Economic Hardships and Mismanagement
South Sudan’s economic management is at dismay and the 90 per cent of
South Sudan’s revenue, which accrued from natural oil and gas, is disturbed
due to damage to some of the fields, caused by air strikes and shutdown process
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in January 2012.18 There is expectation that there could be return to pre-shutdown
levels of production and profit at least by the end of 2016. However, experts
warn that future shutdowns, particularly if they last for more than six months,
may cause lasting damage to the economy.19 Since independence, the government
has signed oil and gas deals; unfortunately the government is not transparent
on the trade and transactions on these resources and the oil revenues are largely
unaccounted for in the country due to corrupt practices.20 Alongside corruption,
insecurity, uncertainty and risks in the country have resulted in disinterest of
the investors in the energy sector and those who have already invested in the
country, particularly in the energy sector, have started or withdrawn their shares
and assets, evacuated staff and workers from the oil and gas fields. A crucial
challenge the government of South Sudan faces today includes the management
of oilfields of the Greater Upper Nile region. Although the region is a massive
exporter of crude, yet there has been no discernible benefit that reaches to the
local communities. As a consequence, the unemployed youth turns vulnerable
to recruitment by pro or anti-government forces in South Sudan.21
Like oil and gas, there is the dismal management of aid and contributions
contributed by the donor agencies for the purpose of rehabilitation and
reconstruction in the war-ravaged economy. Due to lack of trained personnel
capable of project making, donors’ money has been utilised little for the
development of the region during the interim period and beyond. Spent money
mainly covers government officials’ salaries, in addition to the rehabilitation
of destroyed infrastructure. Unfortunately, government expenditure is huge in
providing salary and facilities to its jumbo army and large cabinet. Thus, donor
money and aid that would have been used for removal of poverty, economic
restructuring and development has been diverted for armed forces, ministers
and officials. Moreover, alongside corruption, lack of qualified financial
personnel, financial regulations and poor management, put together, adversely
affected successful implementation of developmental plans and programmes.
This can justify why old projects and industries initiated and developed in the
last few years have failed to resolve problems in sectors or industries like Nzara
Agro-Industry, Wau Canning Factory, Sugar Melut project and Mongala, Sugar,
textile industry in Bor and tea and coffee plantation in Eastern Equatoria.
Moreover, most of the revenue generated from these sectors did not reach the
government treasury but went to individuals’ pockets.22
However, on the other side of the aid and loan, the donors’ record is already
looking lamentable. Unlike other countries emerging from conflict, such as
Sierra Leone and Rwanda, there are no long-term pooled funding commitments
in place, which makes any strategic planning difficult in South Sudan. Current
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funding is due to run out by the end of 2015 and there is still no plan for what
will follow. The World Bank had a pooled fund of 800 million dollars to spend
at the time of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, but less than a
third has been utilised. For example, only 12 of the 114 schools it promised,
have been built.23
Neighbourhood Dispute Hindering the Peace Process
Persistent tensions between South Sudan and Sudan over the sharing of oil
revenues and border and territorial disputes, particularly in the Heglig and Abyei
region, pose challenge to peace and security in the region. There are references
that the government of Sudan has provided support and assistance to the
Southern Sudanese rebels with funds, weapons and ammunitions. Recently,
rebel leader of South Sudan, David Yau Yau, accepted the amnesty deal with
the Kiir government, who established a new administrative area for the Murle
ethnic homeland called the Greater Pibor Administrative Area. Unfortunately,
Yau Yau has been accused of being benefitted from Khartoum’s support.24
Although Juba and Khartoum agreed to temporary security arrangements for
Abyei, including withdrawal of all the forces25, the long-term viability of these
arrangements and status of Abyei is still unclear. Within a few months of its
independence, the Sudanese government had been accused of stealing South
Sudanese oil by constructing secret pipelines and diverting the oil to its own
refineries. To a counter response, Khartoum stopped the South Sudanese oil
reaching international markets through its ports. The imminent result, therefore,
included shutdown of oil industry for almost a year26 and loss of 98 per cent of
oil revenue for South Sudan. With tensions mounting, in April 2012, violence
between the two countries erupted along the border i.e. over the Heglig oil
installation. Through considerable international pressure, including resolutions
by the African Union and United Nations, the international community helped
both the countries to de-escalate confrontation and resumption of negotiations
on oil supply. On 27 September 2012, Sudan and South Sudan reached a series
of agreements that will, among other things, restart oil production and establish
a demilitarised zone along the shared border.27 Unfortunately, little progress
has been made on the implementation part of the agreements.
Apart from these issues, the relationship between the two countries remains
tense since most of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), signed in 2005, are yet to be implemented. The Kirr government has
stressed that the revenue (oil and non-oil), which is due for the South Sudan
under the CPA has not been released on time, adding that, all the institutions of
the country were not taking off due to lack of money. But, on the other hand,
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Khartoum refutes the charges that the Government of National Unity of South
Sudan was not living up to its commitment for wealth sharing and if there was
shortage of money in the Juba, it might have been due to corruption in the
SPLM-led government.28 Along with low intensity warfare between the two
countries, suspended oil production and oil supply disruption have led to fiscal
austerity measures and economic shocks in South Sudan. Yet, there exists a
complex interrelationship and interdependence between the two countries.
Resolution of dispute between the two countries is not possible without a
peaceful South Sudan, and Sudan is the potential country that can actually
claim to have understanding of South Sudan’s tribal friction and geopolitical
strategy and can be a strong asset to solution. Unfortunately, Sudan has ruled
out any form of direct political involvement in South Sudan.29
Problems on International Initiatives
South Sudanese problems have dragged the United Nations (UN), African
Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) for
the restoration of peace and stability in the country and avoidance of
humanitarian catastrophe. However, these organisations face the following
problems and challenges in one form or another.
IGAD: Problems Within
The largest ever initiative for solution of South Sudan problem is taken by
IGAD, a seven-country economic and trading group in Eastern Africa, that
aims at enabling the parties to reach in an inclusive manner for resolution of
the problem and initiation of dialogue. However, it has some limitations. Firstly,
the IGAD, although a neutral mediator, is a warring party in the conflict with
the South Sudanese government. It has, therefore, failed to take strict and
punitive measures against the perpetrators, within and outside the government,
who violate the ceasefire agreements. Secondly, since the independence of South
Sudan in 2011, Uganda, the leading country of IGAD in the peace keeping
force, has sought to posit itself as an influential investor in the new country by
integrating road, rail and energy infrastructure with the country of South Sudan.30
The country is clearly in favour of President Kiir for greater stability in the
region since Juba is the strategic ally31 of Uganda. The question that arises:
How can Uganda be an impartial actor in brokering peace in the region? More
significantly, the number of Ugandan troops which have entered South Sudan
are not clear on their intentions. Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa has
also made it clear that “Ugandan troops are going to stay for as long as the
government of South Sudan needs us.”32 Thirdly, Ethiopia, which is hosting the
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peace talks, is asking Uganda to withdraw its forces from South Sudan to avoid
regional confrontations and suspicion. Fourthly, the SPLM as an organisation
has no workable structures like other political organisations to sense, feel and
restrain itself as demonstrated by its three decades of existence. Therefore, this
political platform sometimes referred to as ‘pathological organisation is in a
state of self destruction’.33
UNMISS: Limited with Operations
The United Nations peacekeeping mission personnel have limited capacity
to protect civilians under its existing mandate due to some specific reasons.
Firstly, the United Nations Mission for South Sudan (UNMISS) in many cases
is under the frequent attacks of militants. Secondly, lack of paved roads outside
the capital significantly hinders the mobility of the UN peacekeepers and other
forces. Thirdly, bureaucratic harassment against relief organisations, logistical
challenges, and government restrictions constrain humanitarian activities and
critical assistance across the country.34 Fourthly, because of insistence of United
States and European Union, the United Nations has issued limited sanctions,
but, there is the need of punitive actions and strict measures against military
commanders on both sides for mass atrocities and human rights violations.35
Other Factors: Aggravating the Crisis
Firstly, the United States and other donors have invested considerable
resources in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs
and security sector transformation initiatives. However, inter-communal
mistrust, massive underdevelopment, and few near-term prospects for
employment hinder the very purpose of DDR.36 Secondly, without the political
support of the international community such as the United States, UK, Norway
and Italy, the people of South Sudan would not have achieved independence.
Unfortunately, in the current crisis, these actors have shown little interest for
early resolution of conflicts. Thirdly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), 2005, meant for ceasefire and framework or roadmap for eventual peace,
fails to address past human rights violations and war crimes committed against
humanity and restoration of peace, security and stability in the country.37
Fourthly, progress in the process of peace-keeping and peace-making is
limited since both the rebel and government sides wage tough fights to gain
and consolidate ground, so as to maximise bargaining power prior to any
meaningful ceasefire agreement that takes place and constructive talks go on.
Fifthly, disarming different factions is a contentious issue because of the
prevalence of ethnic loyalty and political leader-military personnel nexus.
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Sixthly, many local communities in the country have retained their weapons to
justify their claim for self-defense and thwart off armed cattle raids. Hence, the
disarmament efforts could not reach up to expectations. Seventhly, the United
States and other countries have urged Juba for immediate release of the “political
detainees,” as key to discussions of political issues, but, the government is
slow in releasing several detainees, and finds it tough to release those charged
with corruption.38 Eighthly, Egypt, not a member of IGAD, has offered to
contribute to the proposed Peace Enforcement Forces. However, it is being
alleged that in lieu of its contributions, Egypt will seek South Sudan’s diplomatic
and political support against Ethiopia regarding the Great Ethiopian Renaissance
dam.39 Ninthly, the Transnational Constitution in South Sudan maximises the
powers of the President and limits the opposition, which poses direct threats to
the principles of democratic governance and constitutionalism.40
Roadmap
The problems in South Sudan are matters of serious concern within and
outside the country. However, containing the challenges or eliminating the issue
is not impossible, although a difficult challenge for the national government
and international community. Eliminating group fighting and repairing the
damages done to the relationship between various sections and communities in
society are the two most important issues the government has to address and
resolve. Looking into all these potential challenges and problems, some of the
important and effective measures can be resorted to bring lasting solution to
the country and restoration of peace in the region.
Firstly, the erring parties to conflict should realise that mudslinging with
one another is a burden to their national interest and not a solution to the national
problem, not even to their long-term personal objectives. Hence, they should
effectively participate in the inclusive participation process with their rational
objectives and genuine intentions.
Secondly, a comprehensive national reconciliatory approach, with a
Constituent Assembly and provisional government representing different
sections and communities of the society, would be a successive approach to
establish a permanent constitution that addresses and resolves the claims of all
citizens.
Thirdly, the Kiir government should allow all the ethnic, tribal, political
and military leaders, not convicted with serious charges, to participate in the
peace process and talks, which have been held in Addis Ababa under the
initiatives of AU, UN and IGAD.
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Fourthly, changes must be adopted in the national leadership style which
could demonstrate better governance and which could owe the confidence of
all the stake holders of society.
Fifthly, establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission to prosecute
those responsible for mass atrocities, human rights violations and serious crimes
committed by all groups and individuals since the independence of South Sudan.
This will be a way forward for much-needed justice and reconciliation in the
country.
Sixthly, people-to-people appeal for peace by the government, tribal, ethnic,
popular and faith leaders will reconcile the people to heal the wounds of citizens,
infected with the trauma of the civil war. This will ultimately develop a sense
of national belonging and nationhood in the country.41
Seventhly, involvement of civil society institutions in the negotiation process
and peace monitoring could effectively motivate the rebels, South Sudanese
government and international community for a lasting solution in the region.
Eighthly, there must be immediate and effective implementation of
Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) by all the parties in conflict. They should
cooperate with IGAD and its enforcement mechanisms in facilitating and
providing security to the people of South Sudan and smooth monitoring of
peace resolutions. Meanwhile, IGAD should prove its neutrality to win
confidence of all the sections of society.
Ninthly, the administration of South Sudan is indeed handed over to
inexperienced, corrupt and semi-literate bureaucrats. The harmonisation of the
two administrations (CANS and SSCC)42 has proven to be a bad start in the
course of time. Therefore, qualified, trained and efficient bureaucracy with
neutrality, commitment and determination could make the administration more
viable for better governance.
Tenth, government institutions in Sudan, such as office of the President,
are not yet properly structured except for bureaucratic advisors and legal experts.
There is, hence, the need of a team of researchers and experts in various fields
(think tanks) to guide the President and government on tmatters of governance.
Eleventh, there is the need for strong determination of the Kiir government
to contain corruption in the country. In the process, President Salva Kiir needs
to be strong enough to rid over unwanted developments in the country.
By doing so, he could refute the charges of ‘selective targets’ and ‘ethnic
favouritism’ under his government.
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Conclusion
Ravaged by civil war, South Sudan is in constant threat of insecurity,
displacement, migration, returnee integration and poverty. The problems are
accentuated and complicated with infrastructural inadequacies and shortage or
mismanagement of fund. President Salva Kiir although has shown his
commitment for peace, yet, must prove his neutrality and sincerity on some
issues. On the other side, rebel groups have not maintained restraint to give
peace a chance; also, the President must be supported by all, irrespective of
ethnic or group identities, for a lasting solution. It is extremely important that
all the stakeholders become high priority in the negotiation process and the
government give due weightage to all sections of society. International and
regional players and leaders have demonstrated their interest to contain the
rebels and militants. However, they have not been able to achieve the feat as
was expected due to internal problems and external limitations. In some instances
the neutrality and genuine interests of the organisations or countries have been
questioned owing to their own agenda and intentions.
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